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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
r TAH

LIQrOR CONTROL CoMMIS-

SIOX,

Libelant and Appellant,
YS.
JA~IES

)L-tXDELES, )IRS. JAMES
)I Ax n E L E s, ''JIM's PLACE'',
•' )IERRY MooN INN'', and one
20 foot bar, one 20 foot back
bar, and others, etc..

N·o. 6227

Libelees and Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
That on June 11, 19·39, at Magna, Utah, defendants
were operating a place where one of the businesses was
the ·Sale of intoxicating liquor in violation of Chapter 43,
Laws of Utah, 1935, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of
Utah, 1937. It was a common nuisance, as defined by
Section 195 .o.f said Law, existing at said place. On the
11th day of June, 1939, drinks of whiskey had been sold
to Eugene Oaks and Ralph Reid and James Mandeles
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had been arrested and charged with n1aintaining a common nuisance and affiant had thereupon taken into his
possession certain personal property found upon said
preinises. A return was made to the Court ,of the Third
Judicial District for Salt Lake County as provided by
Section 165 alleging these facts (Ab. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13;
Tr. 3, 4, 5, 6). The Court thereupon issued a Warrant
of Attachment directing said E. \Y. Stringfellow, Inspector of the Utah Liquor Control Commission, to· hold
said property to be dealt with according to law (Ab. 14;
Tr. 8). On the same day a Libel of Information ~was
filed by Plaintiff, alleging that said E. \V. Stringfellow
had seized the property described in his Return and
further alleging that sales of intoxicating liquor had been
n1ade upon the premises in question on May 14, 1939;
June 4, 1939; June 10, 1939 and June 11, 1939, and
that during said time defendants had maintained a common nuisance on the premise's in question in that they
sold intoxicating liquor on said premises and allowed
persons to resort to said premises £or the purpose of
drinking alcoholic liquors in violation of Chapter 43,
Laws of Utah 1935, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of
Utah, 1937. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that a time
and place for trial be fixed; that notice be given to interested persons, and upon the hearing that the property
be condemned and sold as provided by law (Ab. 3, 4, 5,
6, 7; Tr. 1, 2, 2lj2 ).

The Court thereupon entered an

Order fixing June 30, 1939 at 2 P. M. at which time any
interested parties might show cause as to why the seized
personal property, or any part thereof, should not be
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forfeited and sold as provided by law (Ab. 13, 14; Tr. 7).
Xotiet>s of this faet were duly served upon defendants
and copy was .posted in defendants' premises in :Magna,
Ftah. where said property had been seized (Ab. 17, 18,
19, ~0. ~1; Tr. 10, 11, 12). Upon motion of counsel continuances were made until the 18th day of July, 1939.
In the meantime clain1s had been filed by James Giolas,
wherein he claimed certain of the property seized was
mortgaged by defendants to him as security for a loan
of $500.00, and said Giolas at the hearing was made
a party defendant (Ab. 31, 32, 33; Tr. 25, 26). A Claim
had also been filed by Alvin P. Holt, doing business as
Consolidated Amusements, claiming he was the owner of
certain property located in the premises, being coin
operated machines, and accordingly Alvin P. Holt was
made a party defendant (Ab. 33, 34, 35, 36; Tr. 27, 28).
Claim also was filed by Ira Bosen to a coin operated
cigarette vending machine and at the trial Ira Bosen was
made a party defendant (Ab. 38, 39; Tr. 32, 33). Upon
the issues so raised evidence was introduced at the hearing, before Honorable Allen G. Thurman, on J u1y 18,
1939. Counsel stated at this hearing that the only question in dispute was as to what property was used in
eonnection with the operation of the business conducted
upon the premises where the personal property was
seized. It was conceded that there was no question but
what a violation of the Liquor Act had occurred upon
the premises and that at least some of the property was
subject to confiscati,on. After the Court had taken the
matter under advisement, the decision in the case of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Utah Liquor Control Comrnfi,ssion vs. Wooras, -----~~Utah ............ , was handed down and attorneys for claimants asked the privilege of reopening ·the case for the
purpose of having evidence introduced on the question
as to whether a violation of the Liquor Control Act
had occurred in the presence of Inspector E. W. Stringfellow as required by Section 165 of the Liquor Control
Act (Ab. 41, 42, 43; Tr. 36, 37). The case accordingly
was re·opened and additional testimony was introduced
on September 6, 1939. The Court thereafter having
ruled that E. W. Stringfellow did not witness or have
any personal knowledge of the sale of any intoxicating
liquor on the premises where said articles were seized
or any personal knowledge of any violaHon of Chapter
43, Laws of Utah, 1935, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws
of Utah, 1937 (Ab. 51; Tr. 45), ordered the Libel of
Information dismissed and the property returned to
James Mandeles and Mrs. James Mandeles (Ab. 52;
Tr. 56).
:B..,or the purpose of presenting to this H·onorable
Court all of the facts, a written Stipulation of the matters agreed to by counsel in open court before the Honorable Allen G. Thurman, was reduced to writing and
appears as a Stipulation (Ah. 60; Tr. 90).
The evidence as shown by the testimony introduced
on July 18, 1939 and September 6, 1939 and the written
Stipulation presents the following:
E. W. Stringfellow, an Inspector for the Utah Liquor
Contr.ol Gommissvon had known James Mandeles for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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approximately two years, that during that time Mandeles
had run a place of business at .i\Iagna, Utah, kno·wn of as
Jim's Place, being a beer parlor on the main floor and a
dance hall and serving bar in the basement, and that the
building occupied the southeast corner of an inter:Section
in Magna, Utah, (.AJb. 57; Tr. 71, 72). That Exhibit A
was a fair drawing of the main floor of the premises
(Ab. 57). That on the 11th of June, 1939, with Inspectors Ooulam, Jaynes and Mayhue and buyers Ralph
Reid and Eugene Oaks, who at the time were employees
of the Utah Liquor Control Commission, they went to
defendants' place of business (Ah. 57; Tr. 75). That on
numerous occasions in the preceding 6 months said
Stringfellow had wo·rked the buyers at Mandeles' place
of business. About 5 P. M. on June 11th the Inspectors
and the buyers met at a point in Magna, near Mandeles'
place wili.ere they !Conferred (Ab. 58; Tr. 67). Thereafter
the buyers went to Mandeles' place of business. There
was an arrangement between the buyers and the Inspectors that if the buyers were able to buy whiskey
they were to give the Inspectors a signal. Shortly thereafter the buyers came out and again conferred with
Inspectors (Ab. 58; Tr. 77). The buyers again returned
to Mandeles' place of business, the Inspectors remaining
outside. The Inspectors received the agreed signal and
Stringfellow and Mayhue entered the front door while
Jaynes and Coulam entered the side door on the west of
the building (Ab. 58; Tr. 79). When Stringfellow entered the fr·ont door he walked down along by the booths
and saw Coulam pick a glass of whiskey ·off the table
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

where buyers Reid and Oaks were sitting. Inspector
Stringfellow testified he ·could see Reid sitting in the
booth and could see Oaks' arm and could see Inspector
Coulam standing in front of them and that defendant
James Mandeles was standing nearby at a point marked
3 on Exhibit A (Ab. 59; Tr. 80). He saw Coulam pick
up a glass o.f whiskey from the table where Reid and
Oaks were sitting, identified it as a whiskey glass containing a dark liquid. Stringfellow then walked back
to the south end of the bar and defendant James
Mandeles followed him with 2 glasses in his hand. When
Mandeles went to rinse the glag,ses out Stringfellow
took them and there was a dark stain in them, he smelled
them and they smelled like whiskey (Ab. 59; Tr. 82).
Inspector Stringfellow also testified that he was in
charge of all the Inspectors and buyers at that time and
he had been directed by the Plaintiff to· see if intoxicating
liquors were being illegally sold by defendants at their
place of business and if so to obtain evidence there. An
arrangement had been made with the buyers before they
entered the premises, that if they were able to buy
whiskey one was to leave and come out in the .street,
another arrangement had been made with the Inspectors
that if they found whiskey in any of the glasses upon
entering the premises a nod of the head would indicate
this fact to Inspector Stringfellow. Search of the premises disclosed a pint of Crab Orchard whiskey, from
which the seal had not been broken, in a locked drawer
in the bar. That thereafter Inspector Stringfellow seized
the tangible personal property in the premises.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
In addition to the things seen by Inspector Stringfell{)·W on June 11th hereinafter narrated he knew that
on May 14, 1939, Eugene Oaks and Ralph Reid, as
buyers for the Utah Liquor Control Commission and
under the supervision of said Stringfellow, had gone to
defendants premises in Thiagna at 5 P. M. in company
with another person named Bill Martin and that at that
time defendant Mandeles had sold them three drinks of
whiskey f.or which Oaks had paid 75c and that Ralph Reid
had then purchased three drinks of whiskey for 75c
(Ab. 61, 63; Tr. 90, 91, 92), and also that on June 4, 1939
at about 7:10 P. M. buyers Oaks and Reid, employees
of the plaintiff, bought from Mandeles three drinks of
whiskey and again at 7:35 P. M. bought three more
drinks of whiskey and that during said time they saw
Mandeles sell two other people in the premises drinks
of whiskey, and that ~on June 10, 1939 at about 1:30 A.M.
Mandeles gave Reid and Oaks each a drink of whiskey
and at about 3 :35 A. M. that morning Reid bought from
:Nfandeles three drinks of whiskey for 75c (Ab. 62, 64;
Tr. 92, 93).
A. H. Jaynes and Virgil Coulam were, at the time
of the raid on Jim's Place, Inspectors of the Utah Liquor
Control Commissi,on and they were at the hooth where
Reid and Oaks were sitting with drinks in front of them
and knew it was whiskey and so informed Inspector
Stringfellow by a nod of the head (Ab. 65, 66; Tr. 94).
Buyers Reid and Oaks testified that they purchased two
drinks of whiskey from Mandeles on the evening of June
11th and that one ,of the drinks of whiskey was on the

'
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table at the time the Inspectors entered the premises
and that the drink seized by Inspector Coulam, as seen
by Inspector Stringfellow, had been purchased by the
buyers from Mandeles.
QUESTION TO BE DETERMINED.
The one question for determination in this matter
is whether or not the evidence affirmatively shows that
"a violation of any pr·ovision (Liquor Act) occurred
in the presence of (E. W. Stringfellow)". If, as a
matter of fact, there was no violation in the presence of
E. W. Stringfellow within the meaning of Section 165
then there was no legal ground for the forfeiture of the
property in question. If, on the other hand, there was
a violation of the Act in the presence of E. W. Stringfellow then the case should be reversed and the Court
directed to enter an order o.f confiscation.
ARGUMENT.
This same question was before this Court last year
in the case of

Utah Liquor Control Commission vs. W ooras,
____ Utah ____ , 93 Pac. (2d) 455,
where the Court construed the pertinent provisions of
Section 165 of the Liquor Control Act of Utah in the
£ollowing language :
Is the seizure justified under the provisions of
Section 165 of the Liquor Control Act, as amendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

e~ hy Chapter 49, Laws of Utah, 1937 '?

That secbon proYides that: """"hen a violation of any
p~ovisi~n of this act shall occur in the presence
of any wspcctor * * * it shall be the duty of
such officer without warrant (of arrest) to arrest
the offender * * * and if such arresting officer (the one in whose presence the o·ffense was
committed) has reason to believe that one of the
bu-sinesses conducted in the premises where the
violation occurred was in violation of any of the
provisions ·of this act he shall seize all tangible
personal property. * * *" (Italics added).
Under this section the seizure without a warrant
n1ay only be made by or under the immediate
direction and control of an officer who could at
that time and without a warrant lawfully have
made an arrest. That is, the officer must be one
(a) who personally witnessed a violation of the
Act upon the premises; and (b) who has reason
t~n believe that ·one of the busine,g.ses conducted in
the premises is in violation of some pr·ovision of
the Act. An officer without such two qualifications cannot make a lawful seizure without a warrant. The violation, of which complaint is made
in this action, is expres.sly ·Stated by the statute
to constitute a misdemeanor. Here a warrant
of arrest had not been issued and the liquor
violation upon which libelant based its claim for
forfeiture of the property occurred at least an
hour or an hour and a half before the arrest was
made and had not been committed in the presence
of the inspector who- made the arrest nor was the
inspector in whose presence the offense was committed even present in the building when the
arrest was made. The meaning of ''acts committed in the presence of the arresting officer" is
not elastic but as a general proposition is limited
to acts that are c:;ommitted within the arresting
officer's knowledge of them, such knowledge being
obtained through his sight, hearing, or other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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senses, or by the offender's admission of the facts
made before his arrest. In Ingle v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 518, 264 S. W. 1088, 1090, the
court said: ''We have held in a number .of cases,
and it appears to be the law everywhere, that an
offense, in order to be committed in the presence
of the officer, need not occur immediately within
his vision, but that if he receives the information of the commission of the ·o-ffense through any
of his .senses, the most frequent of which is that
of hearing uncommon and suspicious noises which
he can readily locate, he is authorized to follo-w
it up, and if it turns out that the offense was
actually committed, it will be considered as having been committed in his presence for the purpose of authorizing him to arrest the offender
without a warrant although the crime was only
a misdemeanor; and if the arrest is then and there
made (but not later), it will be a valid one, and
followed by all of the consequences of such an
arrest. That being true, and there is no doubt
·concerning it since we would incorporate a long
list ·of cases to that effect were it necessary, the
officer would necessarily have the right, in determining whether or not an offense was being committed in his presence, to act upon ail the facts
and appearances then and there before him
whether they in the aggregate were obtained by
sight, by hearing, by smelling, or by any other
of his dependable five senses.'' (Italics added.)
The same test as to the validity of an arrest by
an ·officer without a. warrant is applied in Camphell v. Ga-m., 203 Ky. 151, 261 S. W. 1107. Similarly, in Elrod v. Moss, 4 Oir., 278 F. 123, the
Court said that both under state and federal
statutes authorizing arrests without warrants, to
justify arrests made in such a manner, the officer
must have direct personal knowledge, through his
hearing, sight, .or other .sense of the commission
·of the crime by the accused. Allen v. State, 183
Wis. 323, 329, 19'7 N. W. 808, 39 A. L. R. 782;
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State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N. W; 789; Peru
v. United States, 8 Cir., 4 F. (2d) 881; State v.
Luth, 85 W. Va. 330, 101 S. E. 434. Neither the
arrest nor the seizure were made by nor even in
the presence of an officer in whose presence an
offense had been committed.
This case and the language above set forth was before
Judge T'hurman at the time he decided this case now on
appeal and the Findings and Decree indicate that tha
Judge believed that under the -opini1on in the W ooras case
that it was necessary in order to find that a sale of intoxicating liquor, in violation Qf the Utah Liquor Control A,ct,
had occurred in the presence of an Inspector, that the
Inspector s~hould witness all of the details of the .sale,
which would include the placing of the order by the
buyers, the acceptance of the order by the ·seller, the delivery by the seller and the payment by the buyer. It is
conceded in this case that the Inspecto·r did not see the
order pla:ced nor tihe acceptance of the order by the seller,
nor did he see the delivery of the whiskey, nor did he
see it paid for. However, he did see the whiskey in the
possession .of the buyer immediately after delivery and
he did ·see the defendant, Mandeles, returning with two
whiskey glas·ses to the bar, and they contained the very
definite odor of whiskey.

And there is the additional

fact that there wa.s no other liquor upon the premises,
other than the liquor in the possession ·o.f Mandeles, and
there were only two' other customers in the place at the
time. The Court's attention is respectfully called to Section 181 of the Liquor Cont:vol Act as follows:
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''In any proceeding brought for the purpose of
enfinrcing any provision of this act in proving the
sale, disposal, gift or pur0hase, gratuitous or
otherwi,se, or consumption ·of alcoholic beverages,
it .shall not be necHssary to show that any money
actually passed or alcoholic beverage was actually
consumed if the judge hearing the case is sa tisfled that a transaction in the nature of a sale, disposal, gift ·Or purch~se actually took place, or that
any consumption of alcoholic beverage was about
to take place; and proof of consumption or intended consumption of alcoholic beverage on
premises on which .such Cionsumption is probihited,
by some person not authorized to consume a.lcoholi!c beverages thereon, shall be evidence that
such alcoholic beverage wa's sold or given t~o· or
pur-chased by the pe\rson consuming, or being
about to consume, or carrying awa:y the same as
against the ·Occupant of the said premises.''
It is the contenti,o:n of Appellant that an offense
has been committed in the presence of an arresting officer within the meaning of Section 165, when the officer
ma.y, under all the circumstances and from the exercise
of his own senses together with ,o,ther information from
sources ·so reliable that a practical and careful person,
having due regard for the rights of others, would act
thereon have rea·sonable and probable cause to believe
that a violati,orn of the Liquor Act had been committed
and there was no opportunity provided for the officer to
obtain a warrant for the ·Search and seizure. This rule
is thus stated in the case of

United States vs. Hilsinger, (1922; D. C.)
284 Fed. 585.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
Before continuing to explore ~other cases along the
same line, we wish to take this opportunity of pointing
out the nature of the Liquor Control Act, because the
nature of the A!c.t and its practical application is material
to the construction of the verbage appearing therein.
Section 164, which is the section governing seare~hes
made pursuant to search and seizure warrants provides
that warrants may issue when ''alcoholic beverages are
possessed, manufactured, s·old, bartered, given away *
* * in violation'' of the act and a seizure may ~only he
made "on finding alcoholic 1bevera.ges in unlawful possession or use". In .other words, by virtue ·Of the fa~ct
that intoxicating liquors may be lawfully owned it is no1
sufficient to justify seizure to merely find intoxicating
liquors, in addition thereto it must be found that they are
being unlawfully used, whi0h for all practi1cal purposes
means they are being offered for sale, or sold. This reduces itself to proof of sale. In -other words, it has been
generally -considered that under Section 164 that you
must not only prove sales ,of intoxicating liquor but that
upon a search you must find the .stock of liquor from
which sales are being made.
Section 165 requires that an offense be "committed
in the presence .of an Inspector.'' An Inspector is a
peace ,officer and they are charged with the duty of enforcing the law. An Inspector is not an informant, an
under·cover man, or a stool pigeon. A violation of the
Liquor Control Act is a premeditated ,offens·e undertaken
for profit, and the perpetrator of the offense undertakes
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to prote-ct himself insofar as possible from detection and
his first step is to make him·self familiar with the officers of the Utah I~iquor Oontrol Commission. Beooming
practical again, it can be truly said that if the Inspectors
of the Utah Liquor Control Commission are to be, and
remain, law enforcement ·officers in contrast with undercover agents, buyers and ·stool pigeons that it will be
impossible for them to be pre·sent and see all of the elements constituting the sale of intoxicating liquors. The
nature of their particular task requires the employment
of undercover agent·s as buyers f~om time to .time, who
can, without di.sd~osing their employment, enter premises
where one of the businesses is the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors and may there purchase intoxieating
liquors, then notify the Inspector under whom they work.
This having been done it is the contention 1of Appellant
that for the purpose of .Section 165 the information of
the undercover agents employed by, and working, for the
Inspector as well as the knowledge of the other Inspe-ctor·s working on a particular case should be construed
together and if, as is pointed out in cases hereinafter
cited, a violation of the law actually occurred and the
Inspector was relyin·g upon information whic;h. a reasonable and practical person would consider reliable then
the seizure· will be lawful.
1

In reviewing the authorities, and there is a host of
authorities eons truing the words ''violation in the presence of" it must be borne in mind that practically all
of the cas·es are those under Prohibition Acts where posSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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session of intoxicating liquor was the gravaman of the
offense so that a finding of the .offending fluid and a. determination of possession concluded the offense, whereas
aibove indicated the elements necessary to prove the sale
under the act involves much more.
In interpreting the pertinent part of Section 165 it
hardly seems necessary to go through any exhaustive
analysis of the authorities, but we will cite thereafter a
few cases which mig·ht be helpful. In

Harry Miles v. State of Oklahoma,
236 P. 57, 44 A. L. R. 129.
Miles was ·c.onvicted of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. The evidence showed that Wiggins had been
a guest at the Ketchum Hotel f.or two or three days and
during this time had remained in his room iu an intoxicated condition and that Miles had been observed coming
to and from \Viggins' room. The manager ;of the hotel
had .asked the Sheriff to send a deputy to the hotel,
which was done, and the manager pointed Miles out to
the deputy, who saw a bottle in the left hand coat pocket
of Miles. The deputy arrested Miles and sear0hed him,
found four bottles of whiskey on his pers-on. Miles contended that the ·searcli and seizure was in violation of his
constitutional rights and not admissible in evidence. In
sustaining the conviction the oourt said :
"We are clearly of the opinion that, upon the
undisputed facts in this case, the officer was authorized to arrest the defendant, because his
conduct in the presence of the officer oonstituted
a breach of the peace. ''
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It will be not~d in this case .tha..t the deputy before arresting Miles did not know that the bottle he saw in Miles'
coat pocket contained whiskey. The fact that it did contain whiskey and that the pos.session of whiskey constituted an .offense justified the arre-st without a warrant
and made the search and seizure lawful. In other words,
Stringfellow in seeing the V{thiskey on the table in front
of the buyers didn't know then, so far as information
coming to his sight or hearing was concerned, that a sale
had been made, but the testimony of the buyers proved
the missing facts and justified the arrest without the warrant and the seizure of t1he property in question.

The

authors of American Jurisprudence state the rule in the
following language:
4

Am. Jur.

22.

"Wha.t a:m.ownts to committing offense in officer's
presence. An offense is considered as taking
place within the view of an officer where his
senses afford him knowledge that one is being
committed. Hence, if it is committed in his hearing and so near that he cannot be mistaken as to
the offender, this is sufficient. Accordingly, an
assault is considered as being committed in the
presence of the officer if he is near enough to hear
the outcries and arrives immediately after the
disturbance has been completed, or if, while outside a house, he hears dis·orderly conduct within.
Where a breach of the peace is committed in the
presence of an officer, it is immaterial that he
could not, at the time, on account of darkness,
actually see the offenders. Under the statutes
relating to intoxicating liquor, the offense is
regarded as committed in his presence when it is
committed with his knowle-dge, whether through
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' 'sight, hearing, or other sen~es, or by the, off~nd~
er 's admission of the fact before· arrest. But it
seems that the mere. transportation of concealed
liquor or the carrying of. concealed. weapons with-:
out ·other circumstances or conditions is not the
·commission of an offense in the officer's presence
so as to authorize an arrest without a warrant.''·
The '":est Virginia Court in

lVest Yirginia v. Koil,
103 W. V a. 19, 136 S. ·E. 510,
holds that a ·Crime is. committed in the presence of au of~
ficer when the facts and circumstances oocurring ·within
his IQibservation, in connection with what, under the circumstances, may be considered as common knowledge,
give him pr-obable cause to believe or reasonable grounds
to suspect tha.t such is. the case.
The Montana rule as set forth in

State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court (1924)
70 Mont. 378, 225 Pac. 1000,
to the effoot that the facts and circumstances must he
sufficient to justify the conclusi1on of the officer that
there is probable cause that an offense is. being c;ommitted in his presence, and in.this connection "probable
cause" wa1s defined as "the knowledge of facts, actual or
apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in
the belief that he has lawful griQunds for arresting the
defendant and is,suing a eomplaint. ''
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The Court recognized the problem of enforcing the
liquor laws of the State of North Carolina, which in
many respects is .similar to the case at bar. In the
case of

State v. Campbell, (1921)
182 N. C. 911, 110 S. E. 86,
the Court said:
"In the case at bar the officers had information
which proved to be correct, and the defendant was
carrying on his person, concealed, a quantity of
liquor in violation of the provisions of the Consol.
Stat. above quoted. The offense was eontinuing,
and the sale had not been consummated at the
time the arrest was made. In many cases, unless
an arrest is made under these circumstances, the
criminal would escape or the crime be committed
before the officer could make affidavit and obtain
a warrant. For instance, if the officers had information, which was reliable, that one was carrying a eoncealed weapon, or was on his way to
commit an assault with it, surely it would be their
duty to arrest the offender, though our statute
and our decisions require that in such case they
should at once take him before a judicial officer
and procure a warrant and institute a judicial
investigation."
Appellant recognizes that an officer has no right
to make an arrest on suspicion, neither has an ,officer
the right to search and seize under Section 165 on mere
suspicion, but where the premises have been ''cased''
as in the ca.se at bar, by having buyers working under
an Inspector over a period of time and the buyers having made numerous purchases of intoxicating liquor on
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the premises, in Yiola tion of the law, and where the
buyers entered the premises under agreement to notify
the Inspectors "·hen the sale is made and a number of
Inspectors entered the premises simultaneously for the
purpose of blocking exits and forestalling concealment
of evidenee or destruction thereof, then we contend that
if the e,·idence actually proves the sale of intoxicating
liquor in violation of the law and that one of the businesses conducted upon the premises was the business of
selling intoxicating liquor in violation of the Liquor
Control Act, that then the search and seizure was lawful
and the property used in connection with. the business
is contraband and should be destroyed as provided in
Section 168 of the Liquor Control Act.
It is respectfully submitted that the case should be
reversed with instructions to the trial Court to enter
Findings and Decree that a violation of the act ~occurred
in the presence of Inspector Stringfellow and that the
property should be confiscated and sold as provided in
Section 168.
Respectfully suhmitted,
PARNELL BLACK,
D. HOvVE 1\IOFFAT,

GEORGE H. LUNT,
Attorneys for Libelant
and Appellant.
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